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Competition amongprofit-seekingfirms in an oligopolistic industry inherently generates incentives
for firms to commit to maximize a performance metric other than profit. We briefly review the
underlyingtheory,analyzeitsramificationsinaCournotduopoly,andconsiderfeasibilityconstraints
fromtheperspectiveofstrategicmanagement.
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broad class of games byHeifetz et. al. in their provocatively titled paper “What tomaximize if you
must?” (2007) The proposition implies that, if profit-seeking players are allowed to choose what to










in the context of Cournot oligopoly by Blinder (1993), Dufwenberg andGuth (1999), Gehrig et. al.








the key issues.Wewill then narrow the focus by introducing feasibility constraints in Section 4 and
furtherdiscussfeasibilityfromthemanagementperspectiveintheconcludingSection5.
　2. Why maximize something other than profit
Acredible commitment by a player in a strategic interaction can influence thebehavior of another
player in away that benefits the first player.Afirm that builds a large and efficient factorymakes a
commitment tomanufacturemoreproducts at a lower cost, and thismay induce a competingfirm to







conclusionsarebroad,general,andhavesupportinevolutionarytheory.Heifetz,et. al. (2007) formally 
demonstratedthatplayersinagenericgamehaveincentivetocommittomaximizesomethingotherthan
the payoffs of the game. Moreover, they showed that such commitments do not disappear under
evolutionary dynamics. Evolution of preferences theory too has shown that agents who maximize a
“subjectiveutility”different fromactualpayoffscanevolveanddisplaceagentswhomaximizeactual
payoffs(GuthandKliemt,1998).Winteret. al. (2009)corroborated thesefindings in theiranalysisof
“mentalequilibria.”Acriticalassumptionunderlyingall theseresultsis thatplayers’commitmentsare
credible and can be observed by other playerswith enough precision.Wewill return to the issue of
commitmentinlatersections.
Theseresultsimplythattherearenoa priorigroundsforpresumingthatoptimizingentitiesengaged
in strategic interactions do best by pursuing payoffs as directly and objectively as possible. On the
contrary, theresultssuggestweshouldexpectoptimizingentities instrategicinteractionstomaximize
something other thanwhat they ultimately seek, and,moreover, strive to credibly communicate their
commitmenttomaximizethatsomethingelse.
　3. Commitment to a performance metric in Cournot duopoly
Consider a Cournot duopoly facing linear demand p = a – q1– q2, where p is the market-clearing
price, 　　  is a demand parameter, and qiisthequantityofoutputproducedbyfirm　　　  .Firmsa > 0 i {?, ?}
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have constant unit costs ci. We assume 　　　　  and 　　　　  , which ensures that both firms
produce positive quantities in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Each firm may adopt a “management
philosophy” that observably and credibly commits it tomaximize a specific performancemetric.All
quantity produced by the duopoly is sold at the market-clearing price, giving firms revenue
Ri = (a qi qj )qiandprofit i = (a qi qj ci )qi .Alloftheaboveiscommonknowledge.
Wewillstudyequilibriumchoiceofmanagementphilosophiesandtheireffectsonprofitabilityusing
the following two-stagemodel. In Stage I, firms simultaneously, publicly, and credibly commit to a
managementphilosophy.Specifically,firm icommits that inStageII itwillmaximizea“performance
function”  i (qi , qjE , ci , cj , a),whereqjEistheconjecturebyfirmiaboutthequantitytobeproducedby
























(a ?ci + cj )?
Nextsupposeeachfirmmaycommittoestimatedemandoptimisticallyorpessimisticallybyabias i.
Thatis,theperformancefunctionfirmscommittomaximizeis:




*( i , j ) = ?? (a ?ci + cj +? i j )
In Stage I each firm looks ahead to Stage II and chooses the bias that will give it the most profit,












(a ?ci +?cj )
andtheresultingquantitiesandprofitsare:














(a ?ci +?cj )?
EquilibriumB also resultswhen firms commit to use optimistic or conservative estimates of their
costs.Specifically,ifeachfirmestimatesitsunitcostas　　 , then the performance function is again 
i = (a + i qi q jE ci )qiandthereforetheequilibriumbiases,quantities,andprofitsarealsothesame
asabove.
EquilibriumBalsoresultswhenfirmscommittopursuebothprofitandoutput.Specifically,ifeach
firm commits to maximize i = i + iqi, then the performance function again takes the form
i = (a + i qi q jE ci )qi and therefore theequilibriumbiases,quantities, andprofits are the sameas
above.
EquilibriumBalsoresultswhenfirmscommittopursuebothprofitandrevenue.Specifically,ifeach
firmcommitstomaximize i = i + iRi,thentheperformancefunctiontakestheform

















a ?ci + ?cj
a ?ci + ?cj
ItisstraightforwardtoconfirmthattheresultingquantitiesandprofitsarethesameasinEquilibriumB.
As summarized inTable 1, several differentmanagement philosophies result in EquilibriumB. In
general, a sufficient condition for a management philosophy to result in Equilibrium B is for the
performance function to have the form i = i + i fi (qi ,qjE ,a,ci ,cj ),wherethefunctionfi is such that the 
first-order condition i / qi = i fi / qi can be expressed as i / qi = g( i ,a,ci ,cj ) for some well-
behaved functiong.Anexampleofamanagementphilosophywhichdoesnotmeet thiscriterion isa
performancefunctionthatincorporatesconcernformarketshare:θi = πi +ωiqi /(qi + qj ).Thisleadstoan
essentiallydifferentmaximizationproblemwhoseequilibriumismuchlesstractable.
Comparing firms’ performance in EquilibriumA and Equilibrium B reveals that the adoption of














firmcouldcommit touseabiasedestimateof thedegreeof substitutabilityorcomplementarityof its
productvis-à-visproducts sold in thesamemarketbyotherfirms. Inequilibrium,firmscommitted to
over-estimate substitutability or under-estimate complementarity, leading them to compete more
aggressivelyintheoutputmarketandearnlowerprofits.
Our assumption of constant unit costs is also not critical to the overall conclusions. In a Cournot
duopolywherecostsincreasequadraticallywithoutput,DufwenbergandGuth(1999)allowedfirmsto
commit tomaximizea linearcombinationofprofitandoutputand found that inequilibriumfirmsdo
make such commitments and end up competing more aggressively, resulting in lower price, higher
output,andlowerprofits.
Lastly, our conclusions do not critically depend on the assumption of certainty about costs and
demand.FershtmanandJudd(1987)allowedfirmstocommittomaximizealinearcombinationofprofit
andrevenueinaCournotduopolyunderconditionsofcostanddemanduncertainty.Intheequilibriaof
theirmodel,firmscommit toplace someweighton revenue rather than justpursueprofit andendup
competingmoreaggressively,drivingdownbothpriceandprofits.
　4. Feasible commitments in Cournot duopoly: profit or revenue
Wehavebeen tacitlyassuming thatfirmscanfine-tune theirmanagementphilosophiesbychoosing
fromalargespaceofperformancefunctionsparameterizedby i.Consideringthatfirmsmustnotonly
choose a performance function but also explain and commit to the corresponding management
Table 1.SomemanagementphilosophiesthatresultinEquilibriumB.Itisassumedthat
parametersarerestrictedtorangesthatyieldinteriorequilibria.
Management philosophy Performance function Equilibriumbias
Demand optimism or 
pessimism i = iwitha a + i
Cost optimism or 
pessimism i = iwithci ci i 　　’’
Concernforprofitand
quantity i
= i + iqi 　　’’
Concernforprofitand
revenue i = i + iRi i
*
=
a ?ci + ?cj






(a ?ci +?cj )
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philosophybothinternallyandexternally,andthenactuallyimplementitwithintheorganization,theset
of feasibleperformance functions is probablyvery limited. In the contextCournotoligopoly, the two




or Revenue; i. e.,eachfirmchoosesperformancefunction


















Note that since both firms ignore their costs when choosing quantities, each form chooses the same
quantity.Furthermore,thecostsdonotaffectequilibriumquantitiesandonlyaffectprofits.




















demand parameters. Table 3 summarizes conditions on cost and demand parameters that make each
outcome a Nash equilibrium. Figure 1 plots the corresponding regions in the space of all possible
duopoliesparameterizedbyfirms’costs(c1, c2).
i { i ,Ri }



















Examining the above results leads to the following conclusions about how the possibility of
commitmenttopursuerevenueinsteadofprofitsaffectsfirms’performance:
1.Both firms maximize profit (region AZC in Figure 1):Whenbothfirms’costsarehigh,neitherfirm
makesuse of the revenue-maximizingmanagement philosophy.StandardCournotEquilibriumA
obtains.
2.Both firms maximize revenue (region XFB in Figure 1):Whenbothfirms’costsarelow,bothfirms
commit to act as if unit costswere zero andmaximize revenue.Compared to standardCournot
equilibriumA,inequilibriumRRfirm1andindustryasawholeearnlessprofit.Firm2’sprofitis
also lower except for a limited set of duopolies satisfying　　　　　　　　　　　　  .Thus,
even though committing to maximize revenue intensifies competition relative to when firms
maximize profit, it is possible for the less efficient firm to benefit.This is because if bothfirms
committomaximizerevenue,firm2’scostdisadvantagebecomesirrelevantforchoosingquantity,
andthusbothfirmsenduponequalfooting.
(a ?c? + c?)?
(a ?c? + c?)?
(a ?c?)?
(a + c?)(a ?c? + c?)




{(c?, c? ) ? ?? (a + c?) < c?< ?c? a}




{(c?, c? ) ? c? > max(?c? a , ?? a)}




{(c?,c? ) ? a(c? ?c?) > (?c? c?)?}
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3.Firm 1 maximizes revenue, firm 2 profit (region FYACB in Figure 1):Whenfirm1ismuchmore
efficient thanfirm2, there is aNash equilibrium inwhichfirm1 commits tomaximize revenue












The [Revenue, Profit] equilibrium has also been studied byBlinder (1993),whowas interested in
analyzing competition between a revenue-maximizing firm and a profit-maximizing firm. Blinder





































Figure 1  Triangle XYZ is the space of all duopolies such that　　  and 　　  when both firms
maximizeprofit.EquilibriummanagementphilosophiesaredenotedbyPP(profitmaximizationbyboth
firms,regionAZC),RR(revenuemaximizationbybothfirms,regionXFB),RP(revenue-maximization
by firm 1, profit-maximization by firm 2, region FYACB), and PR (profit-maximization by firm 1,
revenue-maximizationbyfirm2,regionBDC).
c? ? c? q?? ? ?
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Blinder’smodelfirmshaveidenticalcosts,onefirmisexogenouslyassumedtomaximizerevenue,and






explanation forwhy suchpursuitsmakes strategic sense.Butbecause the theoryhingeson thefirms’
abilitytomakepublicandcrediblecommitmentstotheirchosenperformancemetrics,theexplanationis
incompletewithout understandinghow thefirmsmake such commitments.Onepossibility is that the
commitmentsare rooted is the institutionalenvironmentwithinwhichfirmsoperate.Forexample, the
law and norms governing firms’ relations with employees and shareholders are such that employee






Otherwaysforafirmtocommit topursuesomethingother thanprofithavebeenstudiedunder the
rubricofstrategicdelegation.Strategicdelegationmodelsconsideraprincipal(firmowner)whohiresan
agent (manager) tooperate thefirm. Inone strandof strategicdelegation literature, theownerhiresa
wealth-maximizing manager under an incentive contract that compensates the manager according to
some combination of performance metrics, including those that measure performance relative to
competitors.Takingthisapproach,FershtmanandJudd(1987)showedthat“profit-maximizingowners
willalmostnevertelltheirmanagerstomaximizeprofits.”Inanotherstrandofthestrategicdelegation
literature, the owner selects a manager with certain personality traits, such as compulsion to outdo
competitors (Miller and Pazgal, 2002) or undue optimism about research and development prospects
(Englmaier,2011).Inbothstrandsofstrategicdelegationliterature,commitmenttomaximizesomething
other than profit is rooted in the psychologyof themanager,who is either rationallymaximizing his
privatewealthperhisincentivecontractorirrationallypursuinggoalsasdictatedbyhisoverlyrivalrous
orundulyoptimisticpersonality.
Theconclusion is that toearnmaximumpossibleprofit,afirmdoesnotnecessarilyhave topursue
maximumprofitallthetimeateverylevel.Afirmwhichisnotovertlypursuingthe“bottomline”isnot
necessarilyguiltyofpoormanagement,neglectofshareholderinterests,oranticompetitivemachinations.
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